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NO. 3.

OUR ARMY.

The Necessity of a Well Organized and Trained Infantry
at the Outbreak of War, and the Best Means
to be Adopted by the United States
for Obtaining such a Force.

BY

SECOND LIEUTENANT J. G. HARBORD,

Fifth U. S. Cavalry.



PRIZE ESSAY FOR 1897.

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Prize Essay of Infantry Society.

THE NECESSITY OF A WELL ORGANIZED AND TRAINED INFANTRY AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR, AND THE BEST MEANS TO BE ADOPTED BY THE UNITED STATES FOR OBTAINING SUCH A FORCE.

By LIEUT. J. G. HARBORD, 5TH U. S. CAVALRY.

There is a rank due the United States among Nations which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost by a reputation for weakness. If we desire peace, one of the most powerful instruments in our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war.—GEORGE WASHINGTON.

However pacific the general policy of a nation may be it ought never to be without an adequate stock of military knowledge for emergencies.

—GEORGE WASHINGTON.

TO maintain a large standing army has always been contrary to the settled policy of our nation, which has created armies when the necessity for them has arisen. And yet all history teaches that permanent military establishments can be safely dispensed with only at the dawn of that far-off day when "Nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more." So long as the passions of men remain the same, wars will be waged. Years without war may soothe some minds into a kindly belief in universal peace; a growing faith in that phantom Arbitration; the resolutions of Peace Congresses. Our traditional policy of non-interference and our position with the ocean between us and any European foe, may easily lull our nation into a neglect of war-like preparation, and the decadence of our military spirit. Material prosperity; devotion to the arts and industries of a long peace; conquests in the world of commerce and invention have perhaps blinded our eyes to our duty and destiny on the Western Continent. Surely the United States is fated to some day overshadow and dominate all other states on this hemisphere. The instinct of conquest is in the Anglo-Saxon blood and long

before our population is as dense and the ownership of arable land, as difficult of attainment as in the best part of Europe to-day, our people will clamor for the extension of our borders, and the Latin-American with his indolence and improvidence will give way before the energetic and resourceful Anglo-Saxon American. The Monroe Doctrine has become a tenet of the National Creed, and at no distant day the possession of Cuba and the adjacent isles will be essential to the protection of our interests in the canal across the Isthmus. The very possession of over 17,000 miles of frontier (not including Alaska) is a menace to permanent peace. Even without facing one of these contingencies, each of which might mean war, there is no better index to the future than the history of the past. From first to last over a million men have given up life or limb for the flag. Since Waterloo no other nation has had as much war as the United States. Every generation since our Independence has had its war. More lives were offered up on the bloody fields of our Civil War than have been lost in British battles since Harold died at Hastings. Over ten per cent. of the past ninety-six years has seen us at war. Nor does this include that anomaly of war in peace, Indian trouble, in which, for example, from 1866 to 1891 inclusive, 874 engagements were fought with Indians. The sieges and battles of the United States are counted by scores and its minor combats by thousands.

“Military virtue is not the growth of a day, nor is there any nation so rich and populous, that despising it can rest secure.” A similarity marks the beginning of all wars in which the United States has engaged. At the outset of the War of 1812, many posts for want of orders or timely reinforcements fell into hostile hands. A generation later, in 1846, the country was even less prepared for hostilities. When General Taylor was ordered to the southern frontier in the autumn of 1845, the army was numerically less than it had been since 1808. In 1861 the country was as unready for conflict as a treasonable administration of the War Department could render it. Could President Lincoln have put forty thousand trained soldiers into the field at once, the incipient rebellion would have been crushed promptly and sufficient money and property have been saved to pay the expenses of an army of 50,000 men for three

centuries, not to speak of the thousands of devoted lives that would have been preserved to the Republic. For many a year the idea has prevailed that the country is full of trained men. And so it was. Until recently the majority of the officers in our regular army had received during the Civil War practical experience in campaigning and fighting that would have proved invaluable had another war occurred during the prime and vigor of their manhood. But a proclamation will no longer bring trained and disciplined armies into the field. Over thirty years have passed. Only 20 per cent. of our present line officers saw service then. The youngest infantry officer with any war record is forty-six years old and his enlistment was after Lee surrendered. All the grades above captain are of these men. And many officers who entered the service after the war are older than some who fought in it. There are but ten infantry officers who saw war service who are under fifty years of age. And in civil life the veterans who yearly clamor at re-unions for the glory of having been the youngest soldier of the Grand Army are grey-haired men. The reserve of men trained in the Civil War which for years relieved us of the necessity of making special preparation for war, is well-nigh gone. The chief military strength of every nation lies in its citizens between twenty and thirty years old. A generation born since our last war must fight the next one. The great mass of those upon whom the country depends to-day is as untrained as the raw troops that fought the first battles of the Rebellion. Knowledge of the military art, like that of any other, is lost *through disuse*.

The United States is rich in brains, mechanical industries and inventive genius and her citizens are unexcelled in earnestness, enthusiasm, energy, courage, intelligence, and patriotism. There is inbred in them that quality of the Anglo Saxon transmitted through generations of free self-governing ancestry, which has made that race always a conqueror. For this combination when properly trained and directed there are limitless possibilities. But untrained patriotism and intelligence and misguided energy and enthusiasm are not only powerless to save the nation in the hour of danger but through the re-action following defeat may intensify disaster. It is as fallacious and dangerous to rely wholly upon the courage, devotion and re-

sources of the people without practical preparation as it is futile to depend upon isolated position, or arbitration, to forever protect us from war. Bull Run, Ball's Bluff, Big Bethel and a dozen other defeats tell that lack of preparation means disgrace and disaster. Nor is this lesson peculiar to our own history. "The plainest lessons of the Franco-German and China-Japanese wars are that patriotism and numbers are as nothing unless the patriotism has beforehand prepared the numbers for the emergency." The first principle of self-preservation in our day demands that we should be ready to meet sudden attacks, for in this age of electricity and steam the declaration of war and the mobilization of armies and fleets are ordered together. Our raw troops will probably never again be called upon to face equally untrained men as was the case in 1861. The armies and fleets of even second-rate foreign powers are better prepared for war to-day in numbers, command, discipline and facilities for mobilization, than ever before. Should the next time our troops face fire be in meeting one of these, the period we should have for preparation would be the time required to cross the intervening space, for war declared to-day, they could march to-morrow.*

The theory of preparing when dangers threaten is no longer a tenable one and even in the old days when it was possible, armies so raised always lacked the instruction and discipline that can only be acquired by untiring drill and study, and time for the formation of the military habit. To emphasize the wisdom of preparing for war, in organization and training savors of proving an axiom. Surely prudence demands practical preparation in every line consistent with the genius of our peculiar institutions.

Since the Swiss infantry triumphed over the Burgundian Chivalry at Granson, Morat and Nancy, when first the superiority of good infantry over the best cavalry of those days, was shown, the infantry has maintained its place as the solid mainstay and backbone of all armies. In the earliest German and Frank armies the principal arm was infantry acting with cavalry; afterwards degenerating into mere attendants of the latter. These Swiss victories restored the infantry to its ancient place and it has not since lost it. Naturally, for us, preparation for

* See Appendix A.

war means largely preparation in infantry, not only as most important, but as better within our capabilities in the direction of rapid and cheap training. Any war maintained by volunteers, militia, or a general levy inevitably bring into the field a numerous infantry. It can be made ready for war more cheaply and quickly than any other arm, and, strength in infantry combined with skill in command may in a measure compensate for a lack in the other two arms. The Germans, confessedly, till the next war at least, the foremost military nation, say an infantry soldier can be prepared for defensive war in one and for offensive war in two years. Such time is not at all adequate for the making of the cavalry or artillery. Because of this greater comparative quickness in preparation the peace establishment of infantry is by common usage kept proportionately lower than the other arms. Its very susceptibility for quick efficiency results to its own disadvantage in that respect. Again, the general stock of military knowledge existing among civilians is more readily utilized in infantry than other branches. The infantry composes the mass of all armies and the action of other arms must be subordinated to it. With its fire more decisive and deadly than that of artillery, it is the army when drawn up before the enemy; fighting by infantry seems in order almost any time within range, and always some time during the battle, while the opportunity to employ cavalry may not come. Its action is prolonged under exposure while the cavalry charge is over in a moment. It is aptly said that while cavalry are counted by horses and artillery by guns, in infantry the human alone is taken into account, and as more responsive to training and to personal influences its nature opens up greater possibilities both in training and use than other arms. Perhaps the case for the infantry has been by no one more aptly and concisely presented than by Major Wagner in his "Organization and Tactics": "Both numerically and in the effects of its action the infantry is the most important part of an army. It can operate on all kind of ground; it is equally adapted to offensive or defensive action and it can act either at a halt or in motion. It is more easily equipped, more cheaply maintained, more quickly made efficient and is more nearly independent than any other arm. The efficiency of an army is mainly measured by the efficiency of its infantry,

and the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 showed that the deficiency of infantry cannot be counterbalanced by the skill and daring of the cavalry or the devoted heroism of the artillery." General Sherman once said before a committee of Congress that he looked upon two infantry regiments as worth more than the whole general staff of our army, himself included, and that he would rather have Congress abolish him and his office and tear out the first thirty-eight pages of the Army Register than see it disband two such regiments. "The infantryman equipped with the musket and bayonet constitutes the most formidable machine of combat that man can imagine" and "on the battle-field as infantry gains or yields ground it irresistibly draws the other arms with it in advance or retreat." Armies of to-day are much on a par with regard to arms, equipments and munitions of war. So too among civilized nations the same wars serve as lessons for the military student; the same general ideas as to leadership, strategy and tactics, prevail the world over. The victory then in future struggles will follow organization and training unless out-numbered. On the latter score we have nothing to fear. Every other nation of any importance has kept its organization to date with the improvement in weapons. Our country has marked time for half a century in such matters, and to-day maintains an infantry organization, born in the age of flint locks, which would go down in the first engagement with a civilized enemy. Everything seems to demand that our organization be suited to the employment of our excellent arm, that we may apply modern methods to modern appliances. "A solid organization and an equipment with the very best of arms, are the indispensable foundation of tactical success on the battle-field." No mightier intellect than John C. Calhoun has ever ruled in the War Department, and his words written seventy-two years ago are as weighty in wisdom for his countrymen as though the great southerner spoke to-day: "It is only thus that we can be in the condition to meet the first shock of hostilities with unyielding firmness, and to press on an enemy while our resources are yet unexhausted. * * * Without such troops the two or three first campaigns would be worse than lost. The honor of our arms would be tarnished and the resources of the country uselessly lavished, for in proportion to the want of effi-

ency and a proper organization, must in actual service be our expenditures. When taught by sad experience we would be compelled to make redoubled efforts, with exhausted means, to regain those very advantages which were lost for the want of experience and skill."

Granted that a well organized and trained infantry is a necessity at the outbreak of war, it is believed that in the future as in the past our dependence must be on the regular army and volunteers, as such, for: (1) The United States are never likely to maintain sufficient regular army for war needs. (2) Both the Constitution and the jealousy of States stand as a barrier to the militia ever being nationalized up to a standard and organization cohesive enough to meet real war, except when actually mustered into the National Army as volunteers. It is thought, then, that the best means for the United States to obtain a well organized and trained infantry will be found: (1) In such legislation as will give the regular infantry a modern organization and provide for its immediate expansion at the outbreak of war, and such training in peace as will make it a model of efficiency. (2) In such legislation and aid to the militia as will remedy its present defects, and make it as nearly as possible uniform in organization and training with the regular service, that when its organizations are mustered into the National Army it will be as volunteers already trained. (3) In some combination of regulars and militia in systematic instruction.

THE REGULAR INFANTRY ORGANIZATION.

One of the fundamental principles of organization is to have the military grouped during peace in the same manner as in time of war.—Derrecagaix.

In organization and administration it is indispensable that the first place be given to the system and method that will make the army most efficient as a body of fighting men, that the essential functions of supply, equipment and administration that require the commercial virtues, honesty and industry but not great military capacity, take their proper place as subordinate members, not usurp those of the directing head of the body, the army; that the ability to organize, care for, discipline, command and fight troops be sought for, cultivated and rewarded.—General Miles in 1876.

Experience has shown that a regiment of ten companies in a single battalion cannot be handled effectively.—General McClellan.

The ten company organization is awkward in practice and I am satisfied the infantry regiment should have the same identical organization as exists for the cavalry and artillery, viz.: 12 companies so as to be susceptible of division into three battalions of four companies each. * * * Three such regiments would compose a brigade, three brigades a division, and three divisions a corps.—General Sherman's Memoirs.

As before stated the regular army of the United States will never be a large one, but it is the repository of the military usages, and the guardian of the soldierly traditions of our nation. It is to preserve and keep pace with the constant changes in the art of war, and it is the great fountain from which our militia—sometime volunteers—are to draw the knowledge, skill and *morale* which at the time of the country's peril will make them its saviours. In organization it should be a type and in efficiency a model. The organization must be in harmony with the spirit of our institutions, justified by our own history, and suited to the changes time has wrought in arms and projectiles, not forgetting that much of the best in the modern science of war has been evolved from American experience. The best organization for our infantry on a peace establishment, having always possible war in view, would be that in which the enlisted strength was the minimum indispensable for peace duty and the development of its efficiency, with such a proportion of officers as would be required at the outbreak of war for the augmented and war strength of companies and regiments. A basic principle should be that "at the commencement of hostilities there should be nothing in organization to either new model or create" (Calhoun); the difference between the war and peace formation being only in the greater size of the former, and the transition from peace to war being only an augmentation for the latter state. It is thought, then, primarily, that an expensive system of organization for the infantry is imperative to the interests of the country. Active companies should be maintained on a peace footing to be a large fraction of their war strength, and the

number of regiments to be such that in general perhaps only two-thirds of the companies and battalions should be organized, except in commissioned strength. Any ordinary emergency might then be met by simply filling up skeleton companies, and raising the strength of others, uniting recruits in sub-organizations with disciplined soldiers, the skill and discipline previously acquired by the older soldiers being readily imparted to the younger.

The question that presents itself when the size of the army is mentioned, or changes in it suggested, is the one, which properly enough seems always to the fore in the American legislator's brain—that is, cost. It is believed that the numbers of the army should bear a constant ratio to our ever-increasing population; that if of the proper size twenty years ago, it is too small now; and its strength should be measured by the limit which Congress judges the people able and willing to pay in the way of insurance by military proficiency and preparation, against heavy loss in case of war.

Organization is tactical and administrative, the one relating to fighting, the other to the maintenance of the soldier in peace and war. The units are companies, battalions, regiments, etc. The best unit is one that combines both tactical and administrative uses. The field of battle being the great final object of all things military, when tactical and administrative considerations conflict, the latter must give way. Organization for the field should depend: (1) on the range and penetration of projectiles, and the accuracy and rapidity of fire as determining the maximum size of the body which can appear as a unit on the field of battle without annihilation or ruinous losses. (2) On the range of the human voice and eye as further determining the maximum limit of the unit which one man can directly control in action. (3) On the relations which these considerations produce between different arms. The body thus determined should be the correct tactical unit. The number of line officers needed to command is practically the same the world over, and called by whatever name it may be, American "battalion," German "company" or British "wing," the limit to the command which can be directly handled by one leader seems placed by all experience at near four hundred men. That

the best fighting unit for us is the battalion of this size is suggested by our own experience. In the Civil War regiments were handled as single battalions and the best fighting on the hottest fields was done by these regiments dwindled in numbers to about four hundred men, which is slightly greater than the average strength of Sherman's infantry regiments at the end of the war (Wagner). Strong pressure for office, and the greater ease with which new corps could be formed having forced the Government into raising troops in that manner rather than by keeping existing organizations up to strength.*

The Roman centurion was captain of a hundred men. The company—the command of a captain—is the foundation of all good armies. There the men first learn obedience and subordination; their individual drill and guard duty; how to preserve health and strength and take care of themselves; how to cook and live as soldiers. On the books of the company is found the military history of the individual, the record of the changes and progress in his soldierly career, and the data on which is founded his claim for provision in impoverished infirmity and old age. The proper command of this unit means personal contact of the commander with his men, and such knowledge of their dispositions, habits and previous occupations as will enable him to place each man's personality to the best advantage. This personal knowledge, essential to the efficiency of the company, is hardly to be had with more than one hundred men, so that the natural division of a battalion strength of four hundred should seem to be four companies.

The regiment is the military family. It means home and people for the soldier. It is for his daily life while the battalion is the organization under which he faces the foe. The regiment is determined by the maximum of battalions that can be controlled as such, by one leader, fixed by general experience at three. In the regiment administrative and tactical considerations unite and it is the most perfect unit of organization found in armies. "Tactically it is a necessity for a brigadier-general can easily command three regiments where he would find the control of nine battalions a matter of difficulty."

That three infantry regiments should compose the brigade;

*See Appendix B.

three brigades making the division and three divisions forming the corps, in our service, seems to pass unchallenged.

SKELETON BATTALIONS.

The great crowning argument for maintaining commissioned strength for a third more battalions than are actively organized is the provision, at trifling comparative cost, of trained leaders for the immediate addition to the infantry of one-third its war strength in case of sudden need. There is no lack of necessity for these officers in time of peace. Every one familiar with the regular army knows the ever existing scarcity of officers with troops. "Orphan" companies are not uncommon; many have but one officer with them, but an organization with its full complement is so rare as to excite comment. In June, 1896, as representative a month as any, there were on duty away from their regiments, one hundred and seventy-seven infantry officers, as follows:

Infantry and Cavalry School	thirty-two.
College duty	sixty.
Miscellaneous	thirty-two.
With State troops	seventeen.
Recruiting	fifteen.
Military Academy	twelve.
Indian Agents	nine.

That is, the commissioned strength of eleven infantry battalions is already employed away from regiments. Nothing can be required of the army which in the end will be more remunerative than the duty of spreading military knowledge among the people. From the foundation of our government the transmission of such knowledge has been a question of national importance. Not a little of Southern success on the earlier battle-fields of the Rebellion was due to Southern Military Academies. One hundred army officers are now on duty at schools and colleges throughout the country. In these institutions about 15,000 students are under drill; in private schools half as many more, or over twenty thousand in all. Perhaps half these men leave school yearly from various causes. Ten thousand men with more or less college education and enough military training to go to war as company officers and non-commissioned officers, go

into civil pursuits each year. By satisfying the demands for additional officers for such details this number might be doubled. There can be no higher, holier duty than this preparation of the youth of the land to come to the rescue of the flag in the next hour of danger.

One of the best uses of the regular army is in details with State troops. In 1895 army officers were on duty in thirty-three States. In addition to these, twenty-five officers were detailed at the request of governors to attend State encampments. In two States retired army officers fill the position of Adjutant General. Every State and Territory ought to have an army officer regularly on duty and it is thought the service of one to each brigade or fraction thereof could be well utilized. The skeleton battalion proposed would make it possible to employ officers to this extent without crippling regiments to the injury of the active companies. Unless there is behind the army the good will of our best citizens it cannot attain its highest usefulness. In a way our army must defer to public opinion. It must please the people; it is their army. Stationed on the frontier or near the largest cities the service is unfortunate in that people know little of it. Industry, manliness and earnestness, always win friends among those whose voice is said to be the voice of God. Not alone in military lines must these qualities be found but in all proper efforts to popularize the army. The voter must be made to see, through army officers, that proper education of the soldier means time and labor. In time of peace it is chiefly through these details to impart military instruction that our officers, drawn from all walks in life, have the opportunity to prove themselves worthy of confidence, and in sympathy with the people from whence they sprang.

PROMOTION AND RETIREMENT.

“The enforced continuance in subordinate stations cannot fail to tell even upon the best men. The tendency of such a system is to make routine men, to substitute apathy and indolence for zeal and energy. Officers who grow old in one grade and without promotion are but little encouraged to exercise their powers of volition. They come to regard themselves as part of a machine. Self-reliance, resolute action, readiness of

resource and the exercise of individual judgment are trampled out by this stagnation."

The experience of all countries has demonstrated the great importance of encouraging hopes of preferment and reward in the army. The man who embraces the profession of arms gives up some of the citizen's most cherished rights and privileges. A stringent military code hampers his freedom of speech and liberty of person. His movements depend upon the will of others. These are not small sacrifices, yet the officer makes them for the interests of the land under whose flag he serves. In return he hopes for rank and command. A steady, reasonable flow of promotion is essential to the efficiency of an army. An officer must grow up to his responsibilities. The man who walks a quarter of a century in the line of file closers loses the power of rising equal to emergencies encountered later in life. It is only through the constant exercise of self-dependence that an officer becomes capable of real command. A Royal Commission in Great Britain gave as its opinion that the fact that on an average the rank of captain was not attained till past thirty-five; major till after forty-nine, or the command of a regiment till after the officer was fifty-three, was "destructive to the efficiency of the army." The American officer is not less ambitious or deserving than officers of the same blood beyond the seas, and causes that militate against efficiency in the army of England may well alarm us for our own. Sixty-eight of our infantry field officers are past fifty-three, one hundred and twenty-seven captains are over forty-nine, and in June 1896, two hundred and one first lieutenants were beyond thirty-five. These figures are for the present—when these officers reach the next grade how old will they be? It is believed that officers not attaining a certain grade by a determined age should be retired. Obviously many thus retired would be both physically and mentally qualified for further service and might take the place of younger officers on the active list now on duty away from their commands. The employment of a certain number of them with higher rank in the service of the National Guard might well be made a condition to the enjoyment by the several States of appropriations from Congress for the benefit of the militia. In case of war, some of these men would be found able to go to the

front, and numbers of them not fit to do so, might take the place of the able-bodied at recruiting, furnishing officers for depot battalions and similar duty. The beneficial effect of younger blood in the infantry, the incentive to honorable effort that steady promotion would furnish cannot be questioned. Against it can be urged only, that the proposition for graded retirement is liable to raise up enemies for an already large retired list, whose purpose was support to the old and disabled officer. It is true that the retired list is large, but it must be remembered that it by no means represents the current deterioration of the regular establishment of to-day. Over one hundred officers are borne there by reasons of disabilities incurred *in the volunteer* service, and who "thus represent a portion of the wear and tear of those great armies whose rolls show four times as many officers as there are souls all told in our present army." Representing too not the ordinary casualties of army life, but the regular army's share of the living damage done by the war.

RECRUITMENT.

"If we adopt the three battalion organization in peace we shall have to abandon it in time of war unless in connection with it we establish a depot and a system of recruitment which shall insure a steady supply of reserve troops." (Upton.) Speaking of our system of recruitment during the war it has been said "Instead of utilizing the army's capital of long service, thorough acquaintance of officers and soldiers, memories of labors, dangers and suffering shared in common, of dark and bloody days of defeat manfully and patiently borne, of glorious scenes of victory rewarding steadfast valor and unremitting energy, this the greater part of the North blindly and recklessly threw away." But one State adopted the plan of keeping full its veteran regiments. All the others as additional troops were forwarded sent them as new regiments. They fell heir to no glorious history. It was not their duty to maintain the honor of an already famous name or number. Officers and soldiers learned their duties without the benefit of association with experienced men who knew them. The system was unfortunate and wholly unnecessary. The appointment of volunteer officers by governors was not by any rights in the case; it was simply

permitted. These demands of politics must in future be met by confining new appointments to personal staff, casualties, etc., and in as much as possible we must spread military education so that those obviously fit for commissions will largely make the number who claim office for political reasons. A fourth and depot battalion, is in time of war an essential feature of the regiment with three active battalions. This would be officered by those invalided from the front, and from retired officers not able to go to war. Recruits before joining their regiment would receive a course of training in the depot battalion, which would be kept recruited to its maximum strength. When the regiment at the front dwindled to a certain strength, the best trained would be sent forward on requisition.

THE MILITIA.

The great mass of the people of our country are quick in their applause of every act of military valor, and faithful in fostering the military spirit. Alleged prejudices against the army and other military organizations will generally be found to be but the invention of the low demagogue. No nation is more ready than ours to render homage to the loyal soldier. None has paid more honor to its military dead. None has lifted more monuments in memory of national defenders. Our people and our military have always been friends. For a generation the returned soldier has been a most powerful political factor. His story is inseparable from the growth and glory of the nation.

The theory of our institutions is that every adult male is liable to be needed at some time as a soldier, and wise and proper laws for his enrollment should be enacted. The second amendment to the Constitution declares plainly that a well-regulated militia is necessary to the security of a free state. No opinion adverse to this has ever been voiced by any statesman who has expressed an opinion upon it. And yet the law on this subject was enacted in 1792, and practically without change still governs us, though to take its provisions seriously would make us the laughing stock of the world. Probably 99 of every 100 citizens subject to enrollment under its provisions are unknowingly violating them.

The weapons it contemplates are in museums instead of

armories and are valuable as curios and antiquities, rather than for use. In imminent danger of invasion from foreign or Indian foes, the President may call forth such number of our flint-locked powder-horned and spontooned sons of Mars as may be convenient to the field of action and may be deemed necessary. No law of the United States is so generally disregarded. No recommendations of the various Presidents and Secretaries have been so uniformly unheeded as those urging remedies for defects in the militia laws. No other subject of such importance has been so unfortunate in securing appropriations from Congress. No factor is more unequivocally declared as "necessary to the security of a free state" than a well regulated militia. No other element can contribute as much to the spread of the military spirit, or of military education. No other source can supply the volunteer forces in future wars with such numbers of trained soldiers. On no other subject has the history of recent industrial disturbances taught a plainer lesson. On no other force can we depend for the all important "first line" under cover of which we may gain that time which in our next war will be the element we will need most and have the least.

Every nation maintains some form of militia as a reserve to its standing army, and the smaller the regular army, the more important it is that the militia be thoroughly organized and trained to the maximum of efficiency. Our Constitution delegates to Congress the power "to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia" and reserves to the States the appointment of officers and the authority to train the militia "according to the discipline prescribed by Congress." Our militia has a duty both to the States separately and to the Federal Union. For the former it is a force for the preservation of order where the civil authorities are not equal to it or need support, and it is to enforce law: for the United States our fathers intended it to be a force trained as a reserve to the regular army, in emergencies, and a great school of instruction in which the youth of the country should receive sufficient military training to enable the militia to act as a feeder to armies raised for the nation's defense. Under the provisions referred to, and to make the militia meet these requirements, the law of 1792 was passed, and it is the law still in force. Its principal feature is the en-

rollment of all able-bodied citizens between 18 and 45 years of age, and the provision that they shall arm and equip themselves at their own expense. Later a permanent appropriation was made to arm and equip the militia, but the other provisions still remain in force. Either the National Guard of to-day is militia in the sense which brings them under the Constitutional provision and therefore gives them this law of 1792 as their authority for existence, and their organizations must be based upon it, or they are State standing armies and are by the Constitution prohibited. Aside from its provisions which have been rendered obsolete and ridiculous by the lapse of time, the militia law has defects which have been pointed out by every Administration from Washington to McKinley. Many of the deficiencies of the law have been supplied by the States in their encouragement of the National Guard. But the law must be reconciled to the changes time has wrought: to include beyond equivocation the volunteer guard as it exists to-day, and to remedy defects in the National Guard system which seems to have "grewed" like Topsy, and which nevertheless supports the only representative we have of the militia of the Constitution. Suitable legislation must come from Congress, and the States may be trusted to pass laws necessary to utilize the appropriations, allowances, instructors, scholarships, etc., which the United States may make available. A primary defect of the old militia law is in the excess of numbers it holds to service. With our vast and constantly increasing population active militia duty from the whole body of citizens between 18 and 45 is an unnecessary burden, and a proper division of such citizens would be into two classes,—an organized and an unorganized militia. The former to consist of troops regularly volunteering and enlisted and organized by the different States. This organized militia to be subject to call of Congress or the President as now. The unorganized militia to be exempt from military duty to the United States except when called into service by special act of Congress. Notwithstanding the general assent to the importance of the militia, the United States appropriates less for the militia than do the several States. And it is a false idea that the money appropriated for arming and equipping the militia is money given them. The United States manufactures or buys war material, which, instead of be-

ing hoarded in armories, is intrusted to the National Guard, and while some by "fair wear and tear in public service" become unserviceable, the remainder is still the property of the United States and can be utilized by it at any time as it sees fit. From 1808 to 1887 the annual appropriation was \$200,000. Since 1887 it has been \$400,000. One State in the Union alone appropriates \$447,000 for its militia. There are in round numbers 112,000 organized militia in the country, principally infantry. The money spent by the United States on arming and equipping this force averages about \$3.50 for each man, or about half enough to buy cartridges for his annual target practice. This is apportioned among the States according to the number of Senators and Representatives they have respectively. There is nothing in such distribution to furnish an incentive to raise and organize militia beyond one hundred men to each Senator and Representative. As a result the burden of supporting them is most unequally distributed among the States, some raising many more and others less than their just proportion. This same state of affairs prevailed in raising volunteers. Five States furnished three-fifths of the two and one-half millions of men who went to war between 1861 and 1865. New York, Pennsylvania and Ohio sent more soldiers to fight for the Union than all the rest of the nation combined. Ohio has more soldiers' widows and orphans than any other half-dozen States in the nation. Why should Ohio this year appropriate \$133,000 for militia against West Virginia's \$15,000 for the same purpose? Or New York appropriate over \$400,000 and Arkansas, Nevada, Idaho and South Dakota not a cent? Congress should authorize the President to order the organized militia into the service of the United States for instruction for thirty days each year, and the whole amount of the appropriation for the militia should be apportioned pro rata among the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia, according to the number of regularly commissioned and enlisted and organized militia appearing for muster into this instruction service. Other conditions to the benefits of the appropriation should be:

- 1st. The employment by the governors of the respective States of such retired regular officers as the Secretary of War may decide able and fit for such duty as officers of the National

Guard with one grade higher than their retired rank. Each State commissioning its proportionate share and appropriating such sums as with the retired pay of these officers will give them the active pay of the grade held in the militia.

2d. Each State should require every separate organization on which its share of the appropriation is based to assemble for drill and instruction at least twelve times each year, exclusive of the time spent in the service of the United States.

3d. An annual inspection of each organization in the State should be made.

The appropriation for the provision of arms, ordnance, stores, signal, engineer, subsistence, medical and quartermaster stores and camp equipage, including such blank forms, regulations and service manuals as are furnished the regular army, ought to be sufficiently generous to make it an object for each State to comply with the foregoing conditions and organize its militia to obtain the pro rata. It is believed that this would lead to the military training of about the same proportion of citizens in each State and Territory. President Washington, in 1794, said: "The devising and establishing of a well-regulated militia would be a genuine source of legislative honor and a perfect title to public gratitude." The National Guard has met the "devising and establishing" phase of the problem, and any national legislator who can engineer appropriations through Congress that will foster and encourage this bulwark of our defense and security will deserve better of his country than all the "watch dogs" of the Treasury that have flourished since the first Congress met. The organization of the militia should by Congressional enactment be uniform and expansive and in each State conform to the organization of the United States regular establishment. Ten States now have 12 companies to an infantry regiment (3 battalion organization); five have 10 companies to the regiment, and the remainder vary between 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12. The arming of the militia should be uniform. Rifles of .50 calibre are used in some States, .45 calibre in others, and at least three different makes of rifles are in use. Organization, arms, instruction, discipline and administration must be uniform throughout before our militia will reach its highest efficiency.

The elective system of officering the militia prevails in al-

most every State, and it is believed to be a great barrier to progress. Quite often this election proves influence and personal popularity rather than fitness and capacity, and the sooner this system is abolished the better. That it is democratic and similar to our institutions is true, but it seems wholly inconsistent, and irreconcilable to the military idea. Appointments as far as practicable should be of men who have attended military schools. It is further believed that the Constitution should be changed to reserve to the President the appointment of general officers of the militia when called into the service of the United States, limiting such appointments to the general officers and colonels serving in the militia at the time it is mustered into service. This would give them date of commission junior to regular general officers with whom they might serve, and prevent officers with a lifelong military experience coming under the command of a possibly inexperienced general deriving his position from political fortune. "It is only by an effective militia that we can at once enjoy the repose of peace and bid defiance to foreign aggression: it is by the militia that we are constituted as an armed nation standing in perpetual panoply of defense, in the presence of all the other nations of the earth."

INSTRUCTION OF OUR INFANTRY.

"The demands which war makes upon the troops must determine their training in peace. The tasks of a soldier in war are simple. He must always be able to march and to use his weapon. He can only do so as far as his moral and intellectual qualities suffice and his bodily and military training are effective. Moreover, his performance will only be fully useful when it is guided by the will of the leader and regulated by discipline."—German Regulations.

As a preliminary to any joint instruction of the militia and regular establishment, the annual Army Register should include all organizations appearing yearly for muster in the United States service for instruction duty, just as completely as it does the organizations of the regular establishment, and (by concurrent legislation if necessary) each militia regimental organization should for purposes of reports, returns, annual inspections, and the receipt of general orders, be at all times considered as

part of the command of the Department commander within whose territory it is located. This at the time of call into the United States service for instruction or other duty would at once bring it under the direct command of such Department commander, and as much within the reach of the regular staff departments, and at the nation's disposal for rapid mobilization as any portion of the regular establishment. The assembling of troops for instruction during the proposed thirty days' instruction service, would be at the judgment of the Department commanders, under the War Department, limited then, as now, with the regular troops, by the amount of money which Congress in its wisdom thinks such insurance against military disaster is worth. It is believed, no matter how unpopular the suggestion, that an essential to the smooth working of any joint instruction will be the calling of no militia man higher than colonel into the service, or as before suggested, empowering the President to appoint general officers of the militia when mustered into the United States service. It should be remembered, that as the nation is to be the gainer by this joint instruction, upon it will fall the expense of transporting and subsisting the troops on such duty and of paying the militia at such rates that thirty days' interruption to their regular occupations will not drive all good men out of the militia.

Each regularly organized brigade of militia upon request through the governor of its State should have detailed upon the staff of its brigadier, a United States officer, to be at the discretion of the governor commissioned in the militia with, during his tour, such rank as the governor may deem proper. (Such appointments not to be considered a violation of R. S. 1222.)

Each State and Territory should be allowed to detail at the service schools with each army class that enters any number of qualified militia lieutenants that it may care to maintain on such pay and allowances as will permit them to accept the details.

It is not proposed to outline a course of instruction to be followed at any joint assembling of regulars and militia. It is thought, however, that other occasions should have imparted skill in all ordinary drills for bodies smaller than a regiment, and that this period might be devoted to drills, exercises and manœuvres where larger bodies are necessary. The permanency

of location of the militia, and their annual assembling in the same department would seem to suggest that the instruction should be progressive from year to year, remembering that "it is of immense importance that the soldier, high or low, whatever rank he has, should not have to encounter for the first time in war, those things which when seen for the first time set him in astonishment and perplexity" and that while "steadiness under fire and calmness when threatened by danger cannot be acquired by manœuvres with imaginary enemies, almost every other virtue which a soldier should possess can be developed in time of peace."

The final responsibility for our infantry and other forces, their fitness for battle in organization and training, for their lack of it which one day may mean insult and humiliation for the best flag that floats, rests on those charged with the affairs of the Government. The problem should not be held in abeyance till the emergency arises. The strongest nation of giants suddenly aroused from slumber, unarmed and lethargic could not withstand the attack of the smallest army of Davids: "American liberty does not require that we live in a republic crippled in powers or endangered by humiliating weakness."

APPENDIX A.

HISTORICAL EXTRACTS SHOWING WHERE HOSTILITIES BEGAN
WITHOUT DECLARATIONS OF WAR. 1800-1896.

*Taken from Mr. Cutting's Report to accompany H. R. 7318, to 52d
Congress, 1st Session.*

On September 5, 1800, Russia seized two British ships in Russian ports and sent their crews prisoners into the interior without declaration of war.

On July 14, 1801, reprisals were ordered by the English Cabinet. All Swedish, Denmark, and Russian vessels in English ports were seized and a large English fleet under Sir Hyde Parker was dispatched to the Baltic, although there was no declaration of war.

On March 20th the Swedish inland steamer *Bartholomew*, wholly unprepared for any defense, surrendered at the first summons to a force of three regiments of foot and a detachment of artillery under Lieut. Gen. Trigge and a squadron under Rear-Admiral Duckworth.

In 1802 Napoleon sent a force of 20,000 men into friendly Switzerland and seized by surprises Soleure, Zurich and Berne.

On November 23, 1806, the Russian army, during negotiation and after full concessions, suddenly invaded Moldavia and seized Chotsim, Bender and Jassai.

In 1806 England sent an expedition against Curaçoa; her fleet suddenly entered the harbor, and Fort Amsterdam was assaulted and captured.

On March 6, 1807, England sent an expedition, during negotiations, into Egypt, and on the 21st of March the Governor of Alexandria accepted terms of capitulation.

In 1807 the English man-of-war *Leopard*, 52 guns, demanded of the *Chesapeake*, an American frigate cruising off Virginia, the requisition of some English deserters on board the *Chesapeake*. The American captain denied the right of search, whereupon the *Leopard* fired a broadside, killing and wounding several Americans in time of peace.

In 1812, Napoleon by sudden attack on troops of Kowno, declared war with Russia.

On June 18, 1812, the United States declared war against Great Britain. During the month of April previous, however, a general embargo was laid by Congress upon all vessels in the harbors of the United States for seventy days.

In 1815 Murat, King of Naples, attacked Austria without notice.

In 1816 Portugal invaded the Spanish possessions on the river Plate without explanation or previous declaration.

In 1818 the United States, during peace with Spain seized Pensacola and St Mark's.

In 1821 the United States seized a French ship during time of peace.

In 1826 the King of Spain carried on hostilities against Portugal with willful falsehood, without declaring war, but professing friendship.

During the same year England, without declaration of war on Spain, dispatched troops to fight the Spaniards.

In 1827 the Turkish fleet was destroyed by Russia, England, and France without warning of war.

In 1828 the Russo-Turkish War occurred. Hostilities on both sides preceded declaration of war.

In the same year France sent an expedition against the Turks in Greece and captured five fortresses.

In 1831, without declaration of war, Russia fired into, sank, and captured Greek ships and joined in a formal attack upon Poros.

During this same year a French admiral carried off the whole Portuguese fleet and converted reprisals into war. And the King of Holland pressed his troops into Belgium and in nine days crushed the Belgian forces.

On February 22, 1832, France sent a squadron with troops and captured Ancona by sudden surprise during absolute peace between France and Rome.

In 1834 the Spanish army, without notice, crossed the Portuguese frontier, and, by a forced march, surprised and defeated the force under Don Carlos.

In 1835 the inhabitants of Texas raised the standard of revolt against the Mexican government, and declared themselves independent.

During the year 1838 an invasion of Canada took place under circumstances described in the United States Congress as such "that the people were at war while their governments were at peace."

On the 17th of April, 1840, the British ships of war in the vicinity of Naples commenced hostilities and captured a number of Neapolitan vessels, and an embargo was laid on all ports of Malta that bore the Sicilian flag.

In 1844 hostilities by France against Morocco commenced by Prince de Joinville on not receiving a satisfactory answer to an ultimatum.

On May 13, 1846, the Congress of the United States passed a resolution that, by virtue of the constitutional authority vested in them, declared that a state of war existed between the Republic of Mexico and the United States. The President

in his message recited many and various acts of hostilities prior to any declaration of war.

In 1847 a revolutionary junta had been established in Portugal and was carrying on a war against the queen. The war having dragged on for some time, England, France and Spain agreed to interfere, but no declaration of war was made.

In 1848 the Italian insurrectionary war broke out; the King of Piedmont at once joined his armies to those of the Italians, and the war from its nature, was carried on without any formal notice.

On April 25, 1849, the French General Oudinot entered citadel Civita Vecchia. The Roman Assembly protested in the name of God and the people against this unexpected invasion. A short time after there followed the siege and capture of Rome.

In 1850 and 1851 the United States waged the "unofficial" war against Cuba.

In 1853 and 1854 the Crimean War was raged. Hostilities preceded war as follows: The Russian Government seized the Danubian Principalities.

On May 31 the order for the passage of the Pruth was passed.

On June 2, before it was known in London, orders were sent to English and French Admirals to move up the Besike Bay.

On October 22 the English and French fleet, under orders from London and Paris, entered the Dardanelles in express breach of treaty of 1841.

On October 23 Turkey declared war upon Russia and crossed the Danube to expel the Russians.

In 1859, France and Italy against Austria. The Austrian government alleged that the actual commencement of this war was on both sides (as between France and Austria) declared to be due to prior hostile acts, not words.

On May 5, 1860, Garibaldi sailed from Genoa with 2000 troops to wrest Sicily from the King of Naples.

In 1863 war between Austria and Prussia on one side and Denmark on the other virtually commenced by the occupation

of Holstein and Lauenburg by the troops of the two great powers.

In 1870, the war between France and Germany, the declaration of war clearly preceded war.

DURATION OF RECENT WARS.

Taken from a lecture delivered by Captain D. M. Taylor, Ordnance Department, U. S. Army, at San Francisco in 1885.

Year.	War.	Declared.	Decisive Battle.	Days.
1859....	France and Austria.....	May 3....	Solferino, June 24.....	52
1864....	Dano-German.....	Jan. 16...	Fall of Duppel, April 18...	93
1866....	Austro-Prussian.....	June 16....	Sadowa, July 3.....	17
1866....	Austro-Italian.....	June 20....	Lissa, July 20.....	30
1870....	Franco-German.....	July 15....	Sedan, September 2.....	49

APPENDIX B.

Taken from a paper by Colonel H. L. Turner, 1st Regiment Illinois National Guard.

The campaigns of 1894 have convinced the First Regiment that for field service the three battalion organization is an immense improvement over the old eight and ten company formations. During the entire summer's service the battalion was treated as the unit and its commander held responsible for the proper execution of all orders by every portion of his force—for its discipline and for the safety of the territory covered by it. As the major was rigidly held to a strict and wide responsibility, he was given a commensurate authority. The regimental commander refrained carefully from direct dealings with company commanders, and permitted the majors to issue written orders as battalion commanders, in execution of regimental orders.

The utmost effort was put forth by the colonel to maintain such distribution of the troops that each battalion should remain intact, its companies covering contiguous territory. In a thousand ways this policy worked to the advantage of the service, and in two or three isolated cases wherein the commanding officer broke his own rule and meddled with the major's work he made a mess of it.

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